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Splitting large public contracts into lots fosters competition in the long and short run, and 
enhances the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in public procurement 
proceedings. However, the division of contracts into lots can also facilitate anticompetitive 
practices, such as bid rigging. In order to deal with this, economic theory has established 
two basic rules. The first one is that the number of lots should be smaller than the expected 
number of participants. The second one is that the contracting authorities should define at 
least one lot more than the number of incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. This pa- 
per discusses these rules and investigates to what extent they can indeed cope successfully 
with bid rigging. As it will be proved, they are not panacea for all cases of bid rigging and 
it is not always practically possible to apply them. Therefore, they need further elaboration 
and amendments. Suggestions will be made about how we could make them more effective. 





It has been a long-standing belief that dividing large 
public contracts into lots “extends the supplier and 
provider base to small and medium size enterprises 
(“SMEs”)”, while competition is enhanced in the long 
and short run.1 However, apart from fostering com- 
petition, the division of contracts into lots can also 
facilitate anti-competitive activities such as bid rig- 
ging. Bid rigging is an explicit agreement that bid- 
ding firms usually make with the aim of not tender- 
ing at all or with the aim of tendering but in such a 
way that they may not be competitive with one of 
the other bidders.2 As a result, the outcome of any 
sale or purchasing process in which bids are submit- 
ted can be adversely affected.3 
In order to prevent collusive practices when the 
public contract is split into lots, the economic theo- 
ry has underlined that two vital rules should always 
apply. The first one is that the number of lots should 
be smaller than the expected number of participants. 
The second one is that the contracting authorities 
should define at least one lot more than the number 
of incumbents and reserve it to new entrants. In this 
paper, the author is scrutinising the aim as well as 
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nomic theory and she tries to answer the research 
question to what extent they can successfully cope 
with bid rigging. The analysis will focus on the weak- 
nesses that are still to be overcome when applying 
these two prescriptions, without referring to specif- 
ic markets or industries but by using some exemplary 
case scenarios that can be met in various markets and 
industries, as explained below. As it will be proved, 
the aforementioned rules of the economic theory are 
not panacea for all cases, but they need further elab- 
oration and amendments, especially in view of the 
fact that the weaknesses arising from them remain 
unaddressed by the new Public Sector Directive 
2014/24/EU (hereinafter “2014/24/EU Directive”). 
Hence, before concluding, some recommendations 
will also be made in order to render them more ef- 
fective. 
In view of the above, this paper is structured as 
follows. After this introduction, section II provides 
some background information that lays out the legal 
framework for division of public contracts into lots 
in Europe, in order to avoid jumping directly into the 
core issues, without setting the general context. In 
the same section, it is explained why we should care 
about collusive practices, such as bid rigging, in the 
area of public procurement and specifically when 
public contracts are divided into lots. Section III ex- 
plains the content of the first rule of the economic 
theory and monitors all the points that are rather 
weak and incompatible with the effective confronta- 
tion of bid rigging. Section IV examines the second 
rule of the economic theory and highlights its vari- 
ous practical hindrances as well as the fact that sev- 
eral EU Member States may not ensure preferential 
treatment for SMEs, which is a prerequisite for the 
successful application of the rule. In Section V some 
recommendations are made in order to make the cur- 
rent rules of the economic theory more effective. 
Some of these recommendations are based on ideas 
taken from the legal regime of the USA. In Section 
VI the Article draws the main conclusions resulted 
from the whole analysis. 
 
II. Background Information and 
Significance of the Paper 
Procurement planning is the first phase of the pub- 
lic procurement process, in which decisions are made 
about which goods or services are to be bought and 
when. At this stage, contracting authorities can also 
consider whether they will divide a contract into lots 
or not. Article 46, paragraph 1 of Directive 
2014/24/EU contemplates that contracting authori- 
ties have the discretion to decide whether they will 
award a contract in the form of separate lots or not 
and they are free to determine the size and subject- 
matter of such lots. Similarly, the European legisla- 
tor gives Member States an option to render manda- 
tory the splitting of public contracts.4 If this option 
is not made by a specific Member State, like the UK 
which did not implement such an obligation or the 
Netherlands and Belgium that have adopted rather 
“loose regulations” regarding this issue,5 contracting 
authorities are obliged to give reasons why they de- 
cided not to split the contract into lots (“Divide or ex- 
plain formula”).6 This means that in case of a non- 
mandatory provision in a Member State, still the di- 
vision of contracts into lots is the default approach, 
as any opposite decision taken by a contracting au- 
thority shall be justified by having to provide the 
“main reasons” in the procurement documents or in 
the individual report which is required under Article 
84 of Directive 2014/24/EU.7 
As already highlighted in the introduction, the di- 
vision of contracts into lots can favour anti-compet- 
itive activities such as bid rigging. Bid rigging can 
take place when a public contract is divided into lots 
because the simultaneous awarding of lots by the 
same contracting authority may give the opportuni- 
ty to economic operators that usually submit bids for 
all lots to “share the pie”, as they can ensure in this 
way the possession of at least one lot for each of 
them.8 But, even if the format in the award of multi- 
ple lots is not simultaneous but sequential, collusion 
 
4 Article 46, paragraph 4 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
5 M Zimmermann, ‘Economic Efficiency and the Division of Large Procurement 
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6 M Trybus and M Andrecka, ‘Favouring Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
with Directive 2014/24/EU?’ (2017) 3 EPPPL, 229; I Herrera Anchustegui, 
‘Division into Lots and Demand Aggrega- tion- Extremes Looking for the 
Correct Balance?’ in: GS Ølykke and Albert Sánchez-Graells (eds), 
Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules 
(Edward Elgar 2016), 126. 
7 SIGMA and OECD, “Brief 36- Division off Contracts into Lots”, available at 
<http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Public-Pro- curement-Policy-Brief-
36-200117.pdf> (last accessed on 25 January 2018), 4. 
8 G Simona, ‘Public Investments and the Application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU’ in A Almăşan and P Whelan (eds), The Con- sistent Application of 
EU Competition Law: Substantive and Procedural Challenges 
(Springer 2017), 99. 
  
between economic operators can still be enhanced, 
because they have the ability to “identify defections 
from the collusive agreement and to react quickly 
within the same sequential award”.9 Additionally, the 
frequent interactions of economic operators when 
they bid for multiple lots, as well as the pre-announce- 
ment of a series of tenders for awarding the lots of a 
public contract can increase the likelihood of collu- 
sive practices like bid rigging.10 
The reason why we should care about collusive 
practices, such as bid rigging, is that they undermine 
the very purpose of dividing contracts into lots. To 
be more specific, bid rigging can decrease the alloca- 
tive efficiency, meaning “the allocation of the entire 
procurement to the economic operator(s) that are 
willing and able to provide the goods or service for 
the highest value/price quotient”.11 If for some rea- 
son, like bid rigging, the economic operators that 
were awarded with the lots of a public contract do 
not offer the highest possible value/price quotient 
but they submit an artificially raised price in order 
to maximise their profits, the public sector fails to 
achieve the best value for money. The consequences 
of this outcome are even more dramatic when a pub- 
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Handbook of Procurement (Cambridge Univer- sity Press 2006), 183-
185. 
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Journal of Economic Perspectives, 177-178. 
15 Grimm/Pacini/Spagnolo/Zanza (n 13), 168-169. 
16 Ibid. 
17 OECD, “Hearing on Auctions and Tenders: Further Issues- Work- ing Party No. 2 
on Competition and Regulation”, available at 
<https://one.oecd.org/docu- ment/DAF/COMP/WP2(2015)1/en/pdf> (last 
accessed on 5 Febru- ary 2018). 
18 OECD, Second Public Procurement Review of the  Mexican Institute 
of Social Security (IMSS): Reshaping Strategies for Better 
Healthcare (Paris: OECD Publishing 2018), 151. 
19 RC Marshall and LM Marx, The Economics of Collusion- Cartels and 
Bidding Rings (MIT 2012), 63. 
lic contract is split into lots, because in that case not 
only the value for money is not achieved, but also in- 
creased transaction costs accrue, i.e. costs related to 
and accompanied with the division of contract into 
lots, as the contracting authority has to administer 
more than one award procedure and separate evalu- 
ations have to be made for each of the lots procured.12 
As a result, the increased transaction costs in combi- 
nation with the payment of great amounts of mon- 
ey to undeserving suppliers cause loss to the govern- 
ment’s budget and this loss is ultimately borne by 
the taxpayers. 
 
III. The Number of Lots Should Be Smaller than 
the Expected Number of Participants: What Is 
Wrong With This? 
The first prescription is that the number of lots 
should be smaller than the expected number of par- 
ticipants.13 The auction literature as well as the eco- 
nomic theory suggests this in order to prevent firms 
from sharing the lots as if they were spoils divided 
up among them at a low price.14 In other words, the 
purpose of the first criterion is to make it harder for 
colluding tenderers to coordinate and share the pie 
between them, since the discrepancy between the 
participants and the number of lots means there will 
be bid riggers unable to get a slice out of the cake. 
However, this rule has some limits, as it does not take 
into account the composition of firms in the market 
as well as the fact that they may operate in multiple 
markets.15 Another factor that is not particularly con- 
sidered under this rule is the “numerical and dimen- 
sional distribution of lots”, in other words the lots’ 
exact configuration.16 When the size of the lots is het- 
erogeneous and there is asymmetry in the value of 
lots, the scope of market sharing agreements may be 
reduced17 for two reasons. The first one is that the 
barriers to entry may be somewhat lowered when 
splitting the contract in one very high-value lot and 
one very low-value lot, as in this way the market 
opens up to SMEs, which are also able to bid.18 The 
second one is that the higher the asymmetry of lots, 
the bigger the differences in the contribution of ring 
members to the collusive gains. Since “the payoffs 
from participation in the ring are commensurate  
with the contribution of each individual to the prof- 
itability of the ring”,19 this means that the coopera- 
  
tive payoffs of each ring member will be different as 
well. This can be a great problem for the sustainabil- 
ity of a biding ring, especially when its ring mem- 
bers are symmetric. In case of a ring member that 
gets a small and low-value lot, its pay-off will be de- 
creased as well and so this may serve as an incentive 
for it to deviate from the collusive agreement and un- 
dercut it in order to obtain extra profits.20 Despite 
the above reasons, the present rule of the economic 
theory does not contribute at all to the calculation of 
the optimal lot sizes and value, while these decisions 
are in the hands of the contracting authorities which 
have wide autonomy, according to 2014/24/EU Direc- 
tive, to determine the size as well as the subject-mat- 
ter of the lots.21 Hence, we could say that the rule 
plays second fiddle when it comes to the contracting 
authorities’ freedom to decide autonomously, with- 
out being subject to administrative or judicial super- 
vision. 
Moreover, the rule cannot apply effectively to oth- 
er forms that bid rigging can take, such as the cover 
bidding, bid rotation and subcontracting arrange- 
ments. Let us consider firstly the form of cover bid- 
ding. Suppose, for instance, that a ministry is equip- 
ping a new office with furniture. The contract is split 
into lots so that separate competitions may take place 
for the desks and the associated items, chairs, stor- 
age units, meeting room furniture and so on.22 In 
case of cover bidding, one or more of the tenderers 
will submit offers at an intentionally high price or at 
least higher than the bid of the designated winner or 
having special terms which were not contemplated 
in the contract notice. As a result, the relevant con- 
tracting authority will probably reject these offers 
and it will award all or several of the contract lots to 
the designated winner. This is something that can 
very possibly happen in view of Directive 2014/24/EU 
which in Recital 79 allows for package bidding, mean- 
ing that a bidder is able to offer a single price for a 
set of items. Package bidding is permissible if after 
the determination of the tenders that best fulfill the 
award criteria laid down for each individual lot, the 
contracting authorities conduct a comparative as- 
sessment of these tenders with the tenders submit- 
ted by a particular tenderer for a specific combina- 
tion of lots and it turns out that the latter fulfill the 
relevant award criteria better than the tenders for the 
individual lots concerned seen in isolation.23 Article 
46, paragraph 2 of Directive 2014/24/EU is in the same 
line with Recital 79 and it contemplates that where 
the application of the award criteria results in one 
tenderer being awarded more lots than the maximum 
number of lots per tenderer, which is stated in the 
contract notice or in the invitation to confirm inter- 
est, contracting authorities shall indicate in the pro- 
curement documents the objective and non-discrim- 
inatory criteria or rules they intend to apply. 
Let us now deal with the form of bid rotation. Sup- 
pose that a hospital wants to re-tender a facilities 
management contract that covers many non-medical 
services, such as cleaning, security, building mainte- 
nance, catering etc. Though a total facilities manage- 
ment single contract is feasible, contracting authori- 
ties may opt for separate competitions for each ele- 
ment.24 This may be the case if, for instance, a con- 
tracting authority is not satisfied with the joint ven- 
ture that had previously won the total facilities man- 
agement contract or if it wants to open competition 
to SMEs as well. Under these circumstances, the con- 
tracting authority may decide that the duration of 
each single service contract, like the contract for 
cleaning services, will be only two years because of 
its simple nature.25 Since the single service contracts, 
contrary to the complex bundled contracts, are gen- 
erally planned to be re-tendered pretty soon, it is very 
possible for the bidders to agree on the submission 
of the lowest bid on a rotating basis. Such an anti- 
competitive practice of course cannot be prevented 
by just fixing the ratio between the number of poten- 
tial bidders and the number of lots, which tries to de- 
liver more competition for the lots without provid- 
ing for any way that the timing and extent of the con- 
tract division could become unpredictable. 
Regarding the third form that bid rigging can take, 
namely the subcontracting arrangements when they 
are made as a payback (“quid pro quo”), imagine that 
 
20 GL Albano and G Spagnolo, ‘Asymmetry and Collusion in Se- quential 
Procurement: A “Large Lot Last” Policy’ (2010) 10(1) The 
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Article 43, 10.  
21 Recital (78) of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
22 The scenario is taken from the Public Spend Forum. Please see P Smith, ‘Five 
Alternative Approaches to Lots Lotting for Contracts’, available at 
<http://www.publicspendforum.net/blogs/peter- smith/2017/03/15/contracts-lots-
lotting-public-procurement-uk- europe> (last accessed 17 October 2017). 
23 Recital (79) of the Directive 2014/24/EU. 
24 Ibid. 
25 For the usual duration of facilities management contracts, please see H Davis, 
‘Deciding the Duration of a Facilities Management Contract’, available at 
<http://www.fgould.com/uk-europe/arti- cles/deciding-duration-facilities-
management-contract/> (last ac- cessed 17 October 2017). 
  
a public contract is based on the most economically 
advantageous offer “(MEAT”) and it is split into two 
lots. For the first lot, tenderer A submits an offer of 
€200,000, tenderer B submits an offer of €180,000, 
while tenderer C submits an offer of €190,000. For 
the  second  lot  tenderer  B  submits  an  offer  of 
€160,000,  while  tenderer  C  submits  an  offer   for 
€130,000. Though from a pure economic perspective, 
the first lot should have been awarded to tenderer B 
and the second lot to tenderer C, the contracting au- 
thority held that the offer of tenderer C for the first 
lot was much better than the offer of tenderer B on 
the basis of the best price-quality ratio. Therefore, 
tenderer C undertakes to perform all the two lots in 
virtue of Recital 79 and Article 46, paragraph 2 of Di- 
rective 2014/24/EU. After the award of the contract, 
tenderer C subcontracts part of the contract’s services 
to an undertaking that under normal conditions 
would bid for the first lot of the contract, acting in 
this way as tenderer D, but it eventually did not bid 
because it agreed with tenderer C that the latter 
would subcontract a share of the contract to it. This 
issue cannot be fixed by just dividing the contract in- 
to an optimal number of lots (i.e. two lots while the 
participants are three), as still bid rigging can take 
place in the form of subcontracting arrangements. 
Apart from the above, a rule like this one that re- 
lates the number of bidders with the number of lots 
cannot have application in case of public contracts 
that must be awarded as soon as possible. In order 
to be able to predict the expected number of partici- 
pants, there should be plenty of time for a contract- 
ing authority to go to market, investigate it and plan 
the procurement procedure. Indicatively, a health au- 
 
 
26 L Georghiou, J Edler, E Uyarra and J Yeow, ‘Policy Instruments for Public 
Procurement of Innovation: Choice, Design and Assess- ment’ (2014) 86 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 6. 
27 Directorate General for Competition (n 3). 
28 European Court of Auditors, ‘The EU Institutions Can do More to Facilitate 
Access to Their Public Procurement- Special Report No 17’, available at 
<http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocu- 
ments/SR16_17/SR_PROCUREMENT_EN.pdf> (last accessed on 27 January 
2018), 8; See also N Komšić, ‘Big Data for Procure- ment- The Importance of 
Correctly Acquiring and Using Infor- mation in Public Procurement’ in G Piga 
and T Tátrai (eds), Law and Economics of Public Procurement  Reforms  
(Routledge 2017). 
29 European Court of Auditors, ‘Special Report- The EU Institutions Can Do More 
to Facilitate Access to Their Public Procurement’, 61, available at 
<http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocu- 
ments/SR16_17/SR_PROCUREMENT_EN.pdf> (last accessed on 18 October 
2017). 
30 Grimm/Pacini/Spagnolo/Zanza (n 13), 183. 
thority in the UK which was looking for solutions to 
provide low carbon ward lighting had to put the un- 
met need into a procurement call two years before 
the lighting was actually needed.26 When the needs 
that a public contract must cover are urgent, contract- 
ing authorities do not have at their disposal the time 
to predict and calculate the number of undertakings 
that would be expected to take part in the procure- 
ment process. Things can become even more compli- 
cated when it comes to procurements of innovative 
solutions. It may be particularly difficult for a con- 
tracting authority to map the competitive landscape 
by gauging whether the suggested contract or a sim- 
ilar one has been delivered on the market before. For 
this reason, in such cases the calculation of the ex- 
pected number of participants presupposes prelimi- 
nary market consultations. Yet, as already noted 
above, it usually takes between three and six months 
for a consultation process to take place.27 What is 
more, until recently “most EU institutions had no pol- 
icy for preliminary market consultations prior to 
starting the formal procurement procedure”.28 “A le- 
gal basis clarifying the regime for a preliminary mar- 
ket consultation has only been introduced by the 
modifications of the Financial Regulation and Rules 
of Applications and entered into force on 1st January 
2016”.29 Hence, it is not always practically possible to 
gauge or to gauge timely and successfully the expect- 
ed number of participants in a public procurement 
process in order to adjust beforehand the number of 
lots in which the contract will be divided. 
Last but not least, there are procurements where 
“the technical aspects of supply require a very large 
number of lots”,30 like in case of medicines. In these 
markets, it is not always feasible to define the num- 
ber of lots in accordance with the expected number 
of participants, as priority is to procure a great vari- 
ety of innovative medicines that will be readily avail- 
able in the hospital pharmacy, regardless of the par- 
ticipating suppliers’ number. 
 
IV. At Least One Lot More Than the Number of 
Incumbents, Reserved to New Entrants: What 
Is Wrong With This? 
The second prescription that the auction literature 
and the economic theory recognises is that the con- 
tracting authorities should define at least one lot 
  
more than the number of incumbent firms and re- 
serve it to new entrants.31 The special treatment of 
new entrants acts like a carrot that encourages the 
participation of several weak bidders in the public 
procurement process, as they now face a reasonable 
probability of success by having the chance to accom- 
plish certain parts of the project. At the same time, 
this can improve the aggressiveness of stronger bid- 
ders, since the submission of bids by new bidders 
that enter the process in order to improve the pro- 
curement outcome, can drive down the prices on all 
lots, even if the new bidders will not be successful at 
the end of the day. Such a thing fosters competition 
in the market not only in the short but also in the 
long term, as the experience that new bidders gain 
in this way will render them considerable competi- 
tors in future tenders. 
Despite its good intentions, the effect and applica- 
tion of this rule may be rather limited in practice. 
The main reason for this is the broad margin of dis- 
cretion given to contracting authorities by Directive 
2014/24/EU, which means that it is up to them 
whether and to what extent they will apply the rule. 
The significance of this parameter becomes obvious 
if it is considered in combination with the overall ten- 
sion of the EU Member States not to give a preferen- 
can be bid for separately, as well as by Sandholm.35 
However, in another empirical study that regarded 
only the sector of defence, it was found that splitting 
a public contract into lots does not automatically in- 
crease the chances of successful SME participation, 
because some aspects of the tender, like SMEs’ com- 
petence in matters of procedure for participation in 
public tenders, require improvements.36 
Regarding the data of EuroPAM, the author ac- 
cessed and studied the database which is relevant to 
the public procurement legal and regulatory norms 
of each EU Member State in 2015.37 One of the issues 
investigated in that particular collection of public 
procurement rules was whether there is a preferen- 
tial treatment for SMEs in every EU Member State 
in 2015 (Qual-27 in the Microsoft Excel document). 
The rules that give preferential treatment for SMEs 
usually refer directly to this purpose. After studying 
the answers that were given regarding this issue 
based on the legislation of each Member State, it is 
concluded that only seven out of twenty eight EU 
Member States did actually have in 2015 a preferen- 
tial treatment for SMEs. To make things worse, from 
these seven European countries, most of them had 
not taken any specific measures to ensure this pref- 
tial treatment to SMEs. Data from EuroPAM (“Euro-    
pean Public Accountability Mechanisms”) in the area 
of public procurement supports this observation. Eu- 
roPAM is an “observatory of European transparency 
legislation, similar to national procurement portals” 
and one of the areas it covers is public procurement.32 
EuroPAM is also one of the watchdog tools that 
DIGIWHIST (“Digital Whistleblower”) project has in 
order to identify systemic vulnerabilities in the re- 
spective legislations and their implementation. Be- 
fore proceeding to the assessment of EuroPAM data, 
it is important to highlight the fact that in an empir- 
ical study of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) commis- 
sioned by the European Commission in 2014, it was 
proved that “breaking tenders down into lots is one 
of the most important tools to help SMEs access pub- 
lic contracts”, while one of the scatter diagrammes in 
the same study suggested that “there was some mar- 
ginal correlation between the median value of single 
awards (lots) and the proportion of these contracts 
won by SMEs in the EU”.33 This conclusion is also 
supported by Piga and Zanza34 who conclude that 
SME participation in public procurement processes 
is mainly achieved by splitting tenders into lots that 
31 Ibid, 169-170; P Klemperer, ‘What Really Matters in Auction Design’ (2002) 
16(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 169-189; K Binmore and P Klemperer, 
‘The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences’ (2002) 
478(112) The Eco- nomic Journal, C74-C96; P Milgrom, Putting Auction 
Theory to Work (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
32 To see more about the project follow the link <http://digi- whist.eu/about-
digiwhist/> (last accessed on 19 October 2017). 
33 G Wessel Thomassen, P Orderud, I Strand, MP Vincze, P de Bas, M van der 
Wagt and A Yagafarova, ‘SMEs’ Access to Public Procurement Markets 
and Aggregation of Demand in the EU- February 2014’, 52-53, available at 
<https://publications.eu- ropa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/c0681db7- 
e56e-11e5-8a50-01aa75ed71a1> (last accessed on 6 February 2018). 
34 G Piga and M Zanza, ‘An Exploratory Analysis of Public Procure- ment 
Practices in Europe’ in KV Thai et al (eds), Challenges in Public 
Procurement: An International Perspective (Florida: Boca Raton 
2005), 185, 187-188. 
35 T Sandholm, ‘Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourc- ing: How We 
Conducted $35 Billion of Generalized Combinator- ial Auctions’ (2007) 28(3) 
Al Magazine, 49. 
36 M Eßig and AH Glas, ‘Considering Small and Medium-Sized Suppliers in 
Public Procurement- The Case of the German De- fence Sector’ in: D 
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37 The dataset is available at <http://europam.eu/?module=data- downloads> (last 
accessed on 19 October 2017). The respective data for the years 2016 and 2017 is 
not yet ready and available. 
  
erential treatment, but they were content with gen- 
eral provisions. Austria, Germany and Hungary are 
illustrative examples, while Belgium made provision 
for “economies of social insertion” only for tenders 
below the EU thresholds. France had the most de- 
tailed rules about reserved contracts for SMEs and 
Italy being in compliance with the Union rules, con- 
templated that where possible and cost-effective, con- 
tracts should be split into functional lots. In view of 
the overall unwillingness of EU Member States to 
treat SMEs preferentially, it makes one wonder 
whether and to what extent contracting authorities 
will indeed reserve lot(s) of public contracts for 
SMEs, while they have the discretion in the virtue of 
the new Directive not to do so. 
Furthermore, the above rule can face various prac- 
tical hindrances. First of all, the special treatment of 
SMEs may raise issues of fairness and may run afoul 
of State aid rules and the principle of equal treat- 
ment.38 Secondly, to reserve one or more lots to a new 
entrant in the market, reducing in this way the num- 
ber of lots available for incumbents does not neces- 
sarily enhance competition but quite the opposite, it 
may weaken competition for all lots.39 Strong bid- 
ders may disappear from the market altogether if 
they cannot get a share of sizeable procurement con- 
tracts.40 Thirdly, defining just one lot more than the 
number of incumbents and reserving it to new en- 
trants does not guarantee that eventually the market 
will not be shared by incumbents. Quite the oppo- 
site, the possibility of awarding more than one lots 
to the same tenderer, according to Directive 
2014/24/EU (Recital (79) and Article 46, paragraph 2) 
 
 
38 OECD, ‘Policy Roundtables- Competition in Bidding Markets’ (2006), 
available at ˂www.oecd.org/competition/car- tels/38773965.pdf˃ (last 
accessed on 19 October 2017), 35. 
39 GL Albanoo, Ni Dimitri, I Perrigne and G Piga, ‘Fostering Partici- pation’ in N 
Dimitri, G Piga and G Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of Procurement 
(Cambridge University Press 2006), 287. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See more about the Netherlands Auction (July 2000) in the article by P 
Klemperer, ‘How (not) to run auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions’ 
(2002) 46(4-5) European Economic Re- view, 833-834. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See more about the Italian Auction (October 2000) in the article by P Klemperer 
‘How (not) to run auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions’ (2002) 46(4-5) 
European Economic Review, 834-835. 
44 P Cramton, ‘Simultaneous Ascending Auctions’ in P Cramton, Y Shoham and R 
Steinberg (eds), Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press 2006), 112-113. 
together with the right that a bidder has to withdraw 
its tender anytime it decides so, may give an incen- 
tive either for collusion between incumbents and 
new entrants or for blackmail of the latter by the for- 
mer. The fewer and weaker the new players in a mar- 
ket, the easier it is for incumbent firms to blackmail 
them or make them an offer of side-payment for the 
latter to withdraw their tender and so have the re- 
maining lots shared by the incumbents. Similarly, in 
the Netherlands the weak entrant was not able to par- 
ticipate in the procurement process until the end be- 
cause it was threatened by an incumbent.41 Although 
the new entrant complained to the government, the 
government took no action, “perhaps because exclud- 
ing the incumbent firm would have ended the auc- 
tion immediately and it might have been hard to im- 
pose a meaningful fine”.42 Things were worse in case 
of Italy where even a strong bidder (and not just a 
weak one) withdrew its tender at the last minute, sup- 
posedly because there had been collusion by which 
the firm at issue took part in the auction only to avoid 
invoking the rule reducing the number of licenses. 
43 Apart from Europe, it is also the United States of 
America that suffered from the undesirable use of 
bid withdrawals as a strategic device. Indicatively, in 
spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Commu- 
nications Commission (“FCC”), it was revealed that 
rather most of the bid withdrawals were used for un- 
desirable bid signaling and in order to “acquire near 
the end of the auction more preferred licenses that 




For all the reasons mentioned above, the intuitive 
rules of economic theory that we have just analysed 
are not panacea for all cases. In order to render them 
more effective, particular attention should be paid to 
the transparency rules that govern procurement pro- 
cedures when a public contract is split into lots. The 
less information is concealed about the bidder iden- 
tities, the better the aforementioned rules can apply 
in practice, as it will be less likely for cover bidding, 
bid rotation and sub-contracting arrangements to 
take place. As already explained, these are the main 
forms of bid rigging schemes that do not fall within 
the scope of the first rule of the economic theory, as 
the optimal number of lots does not affect their im- 
plementation. 
  
Bid withdrawals is another issue that should be 
expressly arranged if we want both to discourage in- 
sincere bidding in public contracts divided into lots 
and to secure the optimal asymmetry between lots 
and economic operators until the end of the procure- 
ment process. A possible measure could be to enable 
bidders to withdraw their bids in at most two rounds 
of an auction, as FCC in USA already does.45 This 
measure, however, presupposes a great number of 
rounds and this does not always apply in all cases of 
procurement procedures contemplated under Direc- 
tive 2014/24/EU, as it does in case of electronic auc- 
tions (Article 35 of the Directive). Another possible 
solution, inspired again by the legal regime of USA, 
could be to impose penalties when withdrawing a 
high bid.46 The penalty could be the difference be- 
tween the withdrawn bid and the final sale price so 
that the damage suffered by the public purchaser 
may be remedied in this way.47 Yet, as we know, there 
are several European systems of tort or delict which 
do not recognise the deterrence and penal function 
of civil liability, as the US law does48 and most civil 
law systems have hostile approaches towards puni- 
tive awards because they raise public policy con- 
cerns.49 The reason that punitive damages are 
deemed to be contrary to public policy in Europe is 
that they deviate from the civil law’s compensatory 
logic, which is to restore the initial status (in integrum 
restitution) without entailing the enrichment of the 
and was not the result of gross negligence, but it is 
so fundamental in character that it may make the 
whole bid materially different from what the bidder 
initially intended it to be.53 Another example of ex- 
cusable mistake that would enable a bid withdrawal 
could be the occurrence of some unforeseen circum- 
stances after submitting the bid. In any case, it is rec- 
ommended that the mistake should be clearly evi- 
dent and specified in detail in a written notice with- 
in strict deadlines from the submission of the request 
for bid withdrawal. Where the mistake is obvious on 
its face, like in case of typographical, arithmetical, 
transposition errors or errors in extending unit price, 
the relevant contracting authorities should opt for its 
correction rather than proceeding to the withdrawal 
of the whole bid.54 
A last issue that, in the author’s opinion, should 
be clarified by the European legislator is the pricing 
strategy that a bidder can adopt when bundling of 
lots is permissible; otherwise it may serve as an ad- 
ditional incentive for incumbents to act illegally and 
outplace SMEs in the procurement process, as hap- 
pened in the examples above that were taken from 
the Netherlands and Italy. In subparagraph 1 of Arti- 
cle 46, paragraph 2, the Directive 2014/24/EU has left 
unaddressed the question whether the price that a 
bidder can offer for all the lots (or a combination of 
some) can be lower than the one he or she offers for 
injured party.50 Moreover, they imply “a quasi crim-    
inal sanction”51 while the procedure in which they 
are awarded is civil or administrative, as suggested 
in our own case. In view of the above, the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) has tried to take a brave step 
in the direction of formally authorising the award of 
punitive damages by saying that in the domain of in- 
tellectual property, the Member States are not pro- 
hibited from introducing punitive damages as a mea- 
sure where an intellectual property right has been in- 
fringed.52 Hence, it could be said that there is no rea- 
son why the same measure should not apply in case 
of bid withdrawals as well. 
In the further alternative, the author would sug- 
gest the complete forbiddance of bid withdrawals if 
they are not sufficiently justified by the relevant eco- 
nomic operators and if they are not accompanied 
with adequate evidence. Taking some examples from 
the US legislation, sufficient justification that would 
enable the bid withdrawal could be a clerical or me- 
chanical error that was made in good faith (bona fide) 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, 105. 
47 Ibid. See also DP Porter, ‘The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi- Object 
Auction’ (1999) 4(1) Review of Economic Design, 73-97. 
48 G Wagner, ‘Punitive Damages in European Private Law’ in J Basedow, KJ 
Hopt, R Zimmermann and A Stier (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012). 
49 CI Nagy, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of US Judgments Involv- ing Punitive 
Damages In Continental Europe’ (2012) 30(1) Netherlands Internationaal 
Privaatrecht (NIPR), 5. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Wagner (n 48). 
53 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 44B (3) and (4), available at 
<https://malegislature.gov/Laws/Gener- 
alLaws/PartI/TitleXXI/Chapter149/Section44B> (last accessed on 29 January 
2018); See also Stephen Phillips and National Roofing Legal Resource Center 
(“NRLRC”), ‘Bidding: Bid Mistakes, Bid Responsiveness, Bid Bonds and 
Bid Protests’, available at 
<http://www.nrlrc.net/pdfs/0914_9_bidding.pdf> (last accessed on 29 January 
2018). 
54 Code of Maryland Regulations, Title 21.05.02.12, ‘Mistakes in Bids’, available 
at <http://mdrules.elaws.us/comar/21.05.02.12> (last accessed on 29 January 2018) 
See also Phillips and NRLRC (n 53). 
  
the individual lots. If this is the case, multiple bid- 
ding is favoured while value for money can be 
achieved by the public purchaser. Yet, at the same 
time concerns may arise regarding the intensity of 
competition and the participation of SMEs in the rel- 
evant market, as such a thing not only tends to ex- 
pand opportunities for incumbents but it also incen- 
tivises them to use any illegal method, like offer of 
side-payment or blackmail, in order to displace weak 
market players and keep the award of lots for them- 
selves at the end of the procurement process. For this 
reason and also in view of the initial objective that 
the division of contracts into lots has, which is to fa- 
cilitate the involvement of SMEs in the public pro- 
curement market, the author would say that this in- 
terpretation should be explicitly rejected, even if the 




In this paper, an attempt was made to critically re- 
view the two basic rules of the economic theory that 
should apply every time in order to prevent collusive 
practices when the public contract is split into lots. 
We examined to what extent they can successfully 
cope with bid rigging and whether they need further 
elaboration and amendments. As we saw, the intu- 
itive rules of economic theory are not applicable in 
all cases and there is need to make them more robust 
and effective by minimising the amount of informa- 
tion disclosed about the bidder identities when a pub- 
lic contract is split into lots as well as by regulating 
in a strict way the issue of bid withdrawals. The analy- 
sis shows that a possible measure could be to com- 
pletely forbid bid withdrawals if they are not suffi- 
ciently justified by the relevant firms that request it 
and if their request is not accompanied with adequate 
evidence. It was also highlighted that the European 
legislator should not leave unaddressed the issue re- 
garding the pricing strategy that a bidder can adopt 
when bundling of lots is permissible. If it is official- 
ly interpreted that the price which a bidder can offer 
for all the lots (or a combination of some) can be low- 
er than the one he or she offers for the individual 
lots, the public purchaser will be benefitted in the 
short term by achieving value for money. Neverthe- 
less, in the long term this means encouragement of 
big incumbent firms in the market to bid and exhaust 
all possibilities of winning multiple lots in the rele- 
vant procurement process to the detriment of SMEs. 
One of the means that may be used in order to achieve 
their goal is the circumvention of the division of pub- 
lic contracts into lots, as already explained through 
several illustrative examples. 
As long as the aforementioned concerns and ques- 
tions are not entirely overcome, the conditions that 
favour bid rigging are likely to arise at the stage of 
the pre-contractual procurement planning, where the 
contracting authorities make the decision about the 
division of public contracts into lots or not. As a re- 
sult, it is very possible for bid rigging to take place 
at the next stage, i.e. the contracting phase. This is so 
because a procurement planning stage susceptible to 
bid rigging can constitute the ground for new or sus- 
tainable bid rigging practices at the competitive bid- 
ding stage. Therefore, the policy makers should not 
sit back and become complacent in the application 
of the two rules that the economic theory suggests 
every time a public contract is split into lots. On the 
contrary, they should be alert to the risks that may 
arise each time by issuing and adopting guidelines 
that would inform procurement officers about the 
above scenarios, achieving in this way the necessary 
degree of harmonisation when dealing with division 
of public contracts into lots. 
